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A B S T R A C T   
The third of four scheduled Inter-Governmental Conferences on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction met in New York in August 2019. This article tracks the progress made 
in the negotiations, focusing on the four key themes the draft treaty is addressing: (1) marine genetic resources, 
(2) area-based management tools, including marine protected areas, (3) environmental impact assessments, and 
(4) capacity building and transfer of marine technology. Drawing on process tracing (i.e. observations, in-
terviews, and literature analysis), we have observed several critical issues in the emerging institutional design of 
a future agreement for ‘Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (BBNJ). These include the continued ideo-
logical polarization between existing ocean governance principles (‘freedom of the seas’ and ‘common heritage of 
mankind’), disagreements about the delegation of authority to existing or created institutions, uneven partici-
pation of scientific and industry stakeholders, and the challenge of formulating a legal instrument that relies on 
inchoate or inconsistently used concepts. The conclusion looks ahead to the fourth Inter-Governmental Con-
ference, and assesses the potential of reaching an effective agreement before the negotiations are scheduled to 
conclude in April 2020.   
1. Introduction 
“The new instrument must end governments’ grabs in the high seas” 
-Malawi on behalf of Least Developed Countries, opening statement 
8/19/191fn1 
Covering three fourths of the earth’s surface area, the ocean is the 
world’s largest ecosystem. Areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), 
incorporating the high seas and the international seabed, comprise more 
than sixty percent of it. Nearly ten million tonnes of fish are harvested in 
this region annually, with an estimated landing value of US$16 billion, 
or 15% of total global marine landed value [1]. The legal framework for 
ocean governance in ABNJ is not operating in a void, however it is 
largely fragmented and uncoordinated, resulting in a patchwork of 
regulatory schemes covering issue areas from the protection of migra-
tory birds, to deep sea mining, to the dumping of illegal wastes from 
ships, to pollution from land-based sources. There are at least 190 multi- 
and bi-lateral agreements addressing a range of issue areas that affect 
the ocean, not including other forms of global governance, such as 
customary international law, working practice, or informal rules [2]. As 
a result, biodiversity protection has somewhat ‘slipped through the 
cracks’ of ocean governance, especially for the ABNJ [3], and there are 
also concerns about effective and equitable conservation on the high 
seas, as evidenced by the quote from Malawi, above. 
In September 2018, following over a decade of informal efforts, the 
international community began a formal process of negotiating a new 
international legally-binding and over-arching instrument to address the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national 
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jurisdiction (referred to here as the BBNJ negotiations), in line with 
United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Resolution 72/249.2 The 
BBNJ negotiations are structured around four main sets of issues: (i) 
marine genetic resources, (ii) area based management tools, including 
marine protected areas, (iii) environmental impact assessments, and (iv) 
capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. These issues 
represent the basic mandate of the BBNJ negotiations, which is to pro-
duce a single agreement that covers them all. This mandate is restricted 
by the proviso that any new agreement “should not undermine” relevant 
existing frameworks, bodies, and instruments [4]. UNGA Resolution 
72/249 stressed the need for the widest possible participation and the 
use of consensus-based decision-making. 
The third of four scheduled Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGC-3) 
on BBNJ took place at the United Nations headquarters from August 
19–30, 2019. Unlike the previous two conferences, the IGC-3 negotia-
tions focused around draft text produced by the President of the nego-
tiations, Rena Lee of Singapore, released to delegations and the general 
public on July 25th, a few weeks in advance of the meeting. This draft 
text was publicly praised by nearly all delegations during the start of the 
third meeting, and it substantially changed the tenor, pace, and detail of 
interventions compared with the first two meetings (see Refs. [4,5]). At 
the meeting, many delegations circulated text-based proposals, which 
were updated and re-circulated throughout the conference. In the dis-
cussion below, these are referred to as Conference Room Papers (CRPs), 
which were made available electronically to delegates. Despite a lack of 
significant progress in IGC-3, and privately-expressed concerns about 
the timeline, there was no formal discussion about whether additional 
IGCs would need to be scheduled beyond the fourth and final IGC in 
March 2020. 
IGC-3 also differed from the previous two conferences with regard to 
format. Whereas all issues were discussed in plenary informal working 
groups in IGC-1 and IGC-2, with full access for intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs), and which were 
webcast so that those not at the meeting could follow along, IGC-3 
included fourteen “informal informals,” which took place in a smaller, 
more closed session. In general, more contentious issues were scheduled 
to be discussed in the informal format. These informal informals were 
not webcast, press were not allowed, and the attendance by NGOs and 
IGOs was limited to ten total seats. In some small ways, this reduced 
accessibility extended to state delegations as well. For example, meet-
ings often ran over time, meaning that interpretation services were 
discontinued and discussion proceeded only in English. And for the first 
time at these negotiations, the advent of informal informals and ad hoc 
changes in scheduling resulted in four sessions overlapping, which 
greatly disadvantages smaller delegations that may not have enough 
people to be present at multiple simultaneous sessions [6]. At the same 
time however, parallel sessions, especially informal discussion-oriented 
arenas, can foster compromise and dialogue in a way that is less possible 
in more formal arenas. 
While the informal informals intended to move the negotiations 
forward by providing a lower-stakes atmosphere for working out com-
promises, and they were fairly transparent in allowing observers to be 
present, in practice they seemed very similar to the plenary informal 
working groups with regard to content. Discussions about specific terms 
like “established,” “designated,” and “existing” took up significant 
amounts of time, while polarized debates about the applicability of 
principles such as ‘freedom of the seas’ and ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ continued. The most notable effect, and unintended conse-
quence, of the informal format may in fact have been to reduce the 
visibility and influence of NGOs and IGOs, who were not invited to 
speak, and who had to jockey amongst themselves for a limited number 
of seats. In fact, during IGC-3 we recorded NGOs and IGOs speaking a 
total of only 37 occasions (during plenary working groups). In contrast, 
during IGC-1 and IGC-2 they spoke a total of 69 and 85 times, 
respectively. 
This article is the third in a series that seek to identify important 
variables shaping the negotiations, describe developing trends with re-
gard to consensus building, and comment on the obstacles and chal-
lenges facing delegates. Our overall research question is examining the 
factors that can explain the prospects for and design of the final BBNJ 
agreement. Our analysis of IGC-1 explored whether and how the desire 
to maintain and expand national jurisdiction shapes the emerging BBNJ 
instrument [5]. Our analysis of IGC-2 considered whether and how the 
pre-existing ocean governance regime constrains or enables the nascent 
BBNJ agreement [4]. In this analysis, we explore how the negotiations 
seem to have reverted back to the dichotomy between the common 
heritage of mankind and the freedom of the seas, despite attempts to set 
these principles aside in favor of less polarized alternatives, and how we 
therefore appear to be stuck in the middle, with not much time left 
before the BBNJ instrument is due to be completed. 
2. Methods 
The findings presented in this analysis are part of a larger, on-going 
project addressing the governance of BBNJ. Our analysis draws on semi- 
structured interviews, participant observation at the conference 
(including working group interventions and side events) and related 
“process tracing”, which aims to identify sequences and patterns that 
support the development of theoretical ideas. Our overall goal is to 
construct an explanatory narrative that sheds light on the BBNJ process 
and outcomes, in particular the factors that explain the final outcome of 
the negotiations, placing them within the larger literature on regime 
creation and effectiveness [7,8]. We also conducted a desktop analysis, 
reviewing documents connected to the meeting, e.g. statements, official 
documents, and CRPs circulated at the conference, containing delegates’ 
draft language changes and amendments, as well as Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin reporting and other reports from IGOs, NGOs, and the media. 
Quotations provided in this paper are from a dataset we developed and 
have been building at the IGCs, and have been verified with written 
statements and video, where available. At the request of the BBNJ 
conference leadership, this analysis does not draw directly from our 
observations of the informal informals. These sessions were attended as 
much as possible by the authors, however, in order to follow overall 
trends in the topic discussions. 
The processes we are tracing represent influences on the emerging 
institutional design of the BBNJ agreement. The nature and content of 
regime design is critically important to achieving the effective gover-
nance of marine biodiversity, therefore tracing the factors that influence 
the design process can be useful for producing explanations about why 
particular regimes succeed or fail. Although the BBNJ regime is still 
coming into being, the framework for analyzing regime features pro-
vided by Ref. [9] provides a useful guide for categorizing and charac-
terizing various proposals and trends. They argue that international 
agreements can be viewed as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ depending on their degree 
of precision, obligation, and delegation. Without prejudging the suit-
ability of hard or soft institutional forms for BBNJ governance, we use 
this framework to support our analysis of the emerging BBNJ regime 
design. In general, we found that debates over the level of precision 
required and the degree of obligation and delegation that states found 
acceptable pervaded the negotiations. 
3. Overarching issues 
“We must keep in mind not to … create any new obstacles to fishing 
or fisheries” 
2 UN General Assembly Resolution 72/249 on an International legally bind-
ing instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (A/RES/72/249), 24 December 2017. 
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- Iceland on application of MGR provisions, Working Group on MGRs, 8/ 
23/19 
Overall, some interesting trends were observed at IGC-3, including 
continued disagreement over certain issues, as well as new and emerging 
issues and players. IGC-3 revisited core themes from the first two IGCs, 
emphasizing the need for an “effective, practicable and future-proofed 
implementing agreement for the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction” (European Union dele-
gation’s opening statement, 8/19). This recognition of the need for 
future-proofing was echoed by Tuvalu on behalf of the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States (PSIDS), who noted that the agreement should 
be neither too prescriptive nor too broad, leaving too much to be 
determined by subsequent Conferences of Parties (COPs), which could 
delay implementation. The United States also warned against deferring 
too much decision-making to the COP or any new institution, but for a 
different reason: to ensure that member states would not be bound by 
any decision not made in the context of these negotiations. 
In addition, the continued restriction that this agreement “should not 
undermine” existing approaches, which has run throughout the IGCs to 
date, means that the BBNJ treaty will likely not have a hierarchical 
relationship with other instruments [4,10,11]. In the revised draft text 
for IGC-43, the positive framing of “promotes coherence and coordina-
tion” was eliminated in favor of the simple “does not undermine” 
framing (Article 4(3)). However, if the new treaty does not address the 
myriad problems that have emerged since the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was negotiated in the 1970s and 
80s, it may not succeed. In May 2019, a few months before IGC-3, the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services released a landmark assessment on the state of 
global biodiversity [12]. The report painted a stark picture of global 
biodiversity loss, indicating that a million species face extinction, many 
within decades. Shortly after IGC-3, in September 2019 the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change released a “Special Report on the 
Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate” [13] which highlighted 
the dramatic effect that climate has already had on the oceans, including 
ocean acidification, stratification, and oxygen loss. The importance of 
these global assessments was not lost at the BBNJ negotiations; several 
delegates, including the President, referred directly to them. However, 
whether these larger threats are helping bring state parties together to 
draft a strong agreement remains to be seen. 
The visibility of individual delegations and coalitions also shifted 
somewhat in IGC-3. Unlike in previous sessions, the representative of the 
Holy See rarely intervened. The apparent reason for this shift was, in 
their own words, a feeling that their past interventions, which were 
intended to provide innovative middle ground solutions, were not 
picked up by other delegations or reflected in the draft text. The two 
largest coalitions - G77/China and the African Group - also expressed 
fewer, and less detailed, consensus positions than in previous IGCs, 
despite the dedicated efforts of their coalition leaders. The like-minded 
Latin American states, newly rebranded as Core Latin American coun-
tries (CLAM) at this IGC, emerged as a more forceful and focused group 
compared to previous IGCs. A variety of states spoke on behalf of CLAM, 
including Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, and in a side 
event, Honduras noted that the CLAM group was one of the most diverse 
coalitions at the negotiations, in terms of country type. In their opening 
statements, CLAM and the persistently vocal CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community) noted the degree to which they shared positions. Among 
the coalition groups representing small island states, the PSIDS (Pacific 
Small Island Developing States) remained the most active, with AOSIS 
(Alliance of Small Island States) and PIF (Pacific Island Forum) rarely 
intervening. Five different member states spoke on behalf of the PSIDS 
this time, and the coalition intervened on every major issue. Their po-
sitions - which emphasize the delegation of authority to new bodies, the 
rights of adjacent coastal states, and special recognition of SIDS status 
(small island developing states) - seemed increasingly isolated or distinct 
from the interventions of other states and some other coalitions. 
The polarization between supporters of the principles of common 
heritage of mankind (CHM) and freedom of the seas picked up again 
during IGC-3, after a lull in IGC-2. As before, this ideological dichotomy 
was particularly vocalized in the discussions around MGRs and echoed 
many of the same challenges discussed during the negotiations of Part XI 
of UNCLOS [34], circling the divergent goals of developing and devel-
oped nations [14–16]. Although participants at the UNCLOS negotia-
tions had already committed to the CHM principle to govern the 
resources of the international seabed (the Area), it took many years of 
heated debate to agree on what exactly that meant for access to and 
exploitation of seabed resources [17]. Eventually, a compromise was 
reached for UNCLOS wherein all states could access and exploit the 
Area, subject to a management and benefit sharing regime administered 
by the newly-created International Seabed Authority (ISA). The 
compromise was not ideal for any of the countries, however, and it 
became a major issue for the United States in particular, even credited 
with being the reason for the United States’ refusal to ratify UNCLOS 
[18,19]. Historically, maritime powers like the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Soviet Union preferred the application and expansion of 
the ‘freedom of the seas’ principle to ensure their continued ability to 
exploit ocean spaces and resources. These same general patterns of 
disagreement about the applicability and meaning of each principle 
persist in the BBNJ negotiations. 
It appeared that the President hoped to side-step this debate, as the 
draft text did not include an explicit reference to either principle 
(although some articles did reflect parts of the CHM concept). Devel-
oping states emphasized its importance in their opening statements. 
Palestine, speaking on behalf of the 134 state members of the G77/ 
China, asserted that the overall goal of conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biodiversity in ABNJ “can only be achieved when guided by the 
bedrock principle of CHM” (G77/China opening statement, 8/19/19). 
Algeria, speaking on behalf of the African Group, said that without an 
explicit statement of the CHM principle, the agreement would be “like 
putting a ship in the water without a navigational instrument” African Group 
opening statement, 8/19/19. Malawi, speaking on behalf of the Least 
Developed Countries, concurred that the ABNJ as a whole must be 
recognized as the CHM. Despite these clear group statements, individual 
delegations also felt a need to stress the central importance of the CHM 
principle, including Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Myanmar, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sudan. This deep commitment 
to the CHM principle among developing states was evident throughout 
the issue-specific discussions, and the revised draft text for IGC-4 now 
includes an explicit reference to CHM in Article 5 on general principles 
and provisions. 
Despite this disagreement about guiding principles, other issues were 
less contentious. For example, there was broad agreement across the 
package that a BBNJ agreement should only create obligations for state 
parties. For example, delegations roundly rejected the idea that pro-
ponents of a planned activity (which would often include private com-
panies) should be responsible for determining whether an EIA is 
necessary. Avoiding provisions that directly obligate non-state actors is 
typical for international agreements, which overwhelmingly focus on 
international cooperation between states, but many delegates also 
expressed concern about the wisdom of letting companies self-regulate. 
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) - the only clear 
industry voice represented during IGC-3 - repeatedly stressed the 
importance of involving industry in review or guidance functions, by 
proposing the addition of “sectoral stakeholders” and “sectoral exper-
tise” in different parts of the text. Although the ICPC representatives 
remain actively engaged in direct informal talks with national delegates, 
3 A revised draft text was released in November 2019 on the UN BBNJ 
website for the forthcoming IGC-4 in March–April 2020 (accessed 25 January 
2020) [https://www.un.org/bbnj/content/fourth-substantive-session]. 
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these positions still lack specific state supporters in the formal 
interventions. 
4. Elements of the BBNJ package 
In addition to these overarching issues, IGC-3 delved further into the 
four key themes of the BBNJ. Working Groups and informal informals 
were scheduled to deal with the four agenda items separately, and also a 
fifth category of ‘cross cutting issues’ that included questions about 
institutional architecture. Unlike previous IGCs, where a number of 
contiguous days were assigned for each issue area, the IGC-3 schedule 
inter-mixed different issues within single days. These issue areas are 
treated as distinct in the draft text, and also in the analysis that follows. 
4.1. Marine Genetic Resources4 
“The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, the polluter pays, 
the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, the precautionary prin-
ciple/approach, the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind, equity, 
did I mention the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind? the 
ecosystem approach, best available scientific information and tradi-
tional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities, and of 
course the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind” 
- Palestine, on behalf of the G77/China, on general principles and 
approaches (Article 5), Working Group on Cross-Cutting issues 8/28/ 
19 
The topic of Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs), and specifically the 
creation of rules for access and benefit sharing, remains one of the most 
contentious areas of the BBNJ negotiations. The most disputed draft 
articles on MGRs were addressed during informal-informals: access, 
benefit sharing, monitoring, and intellectual property rights. In part, this 
is a result of obvious and on-going polarization between the positions of 
the G77/China coalition and a group of developed states that includes 
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. In general, the 
countries most likely to have nationals engaging in MGR collection and 
utilization in the near term are those which oppose additional burdens 
on that activity, and the countries least likely to engage in MGR 
collection and utilization tend to propose additional regulations and 
regulatory institutions. Some countries routinely took more moderate 
positions on MGR issues - such as Norway, Singapore, Canada, and the 
EU - although their interventions tended to be closer to the anti- 
regulatory pole. Although G77/China remained united that the CHM 
principle should underlie the regime, and that benefit sharing should be 
meaningful and significant, the coalition expressed agreement on fewer 
details of the text compared to other issue areas. According to one 
knowledgeable interviewee, this relative lack of consensus on MGR 
topics is a result of both the rushed and changing schedule at IGC-3, and 
substantive disagreements within the coalition itself. 
Interventions on MGR-related topics did change in notable ways 
compared to IGC-1 and IGC-2. The explicit clash between the principles 
of ‘freedom of the seas’ and CHM faded into the background, and was 
articulated less frequently, during the MGR discussions. This may have 
been the result of having a draft text for the first time, and a draft text 
which does not explicitly refer to either principle. But the overall clash 
of principles still suffused the debate, as the representative from 
Palestine regularly reminded delegates. The strongest and most explicit 
version of the ‘freedom of the seas’ principle came from Russia, which 
suggested that the treaty text should not include a provision regulating 
access to MGRs at all. Other states sought to apply the ‘freedom of the 
seas’ principle by arguing that the initial in situ collection of MGRs rarely 
has a commercial purpose, so that type of access is better understood as 
marine scientific research, a topic which has already been established by 
UNCLOS as an explicit - if undefined - freedom of the high seas (Article 
87). In a debate that is very similar to the longstanding disagreements 
about freedom of navigation in the territorial sea, the idea of prior 
notification is seen as an unacceptable hindrance to some (such as 
Japan, Korea, the United States, and Russia) while others find a simple 
reporting procedure acceptable (such as the EU, Norway, Singapore, and 
CLAM) [20]. 
The clash between ‘freedom of the seas’ and CHM could also be 
discerned in the debate over the modalities of benefit sharing. Divergent 
preferences on the draft text of Article 11 in the CRPs show polarized 
positions. While the United States and South Korea accept voluntary, 
non-monetary benefit sharing, the G77/China, CARICOM, and the Af-
rican Group support mandatory sharing of both monetary and non- 
monetary benefits. Both Norway and the EU took middle positions, 
allowing for some mandatory sharing of non-monetary benefits. Each 
option - voluntary and/or mandatory, monetary and/or non-monetary - 
remains in the revised draft text for IGC-4, signifying a lack of movement 
on this topic in IGC-3. This debate is closely tied to both the topic of MGR 
access, which can itself be described as a benefit, and the CBTMT issue 
area, which also contains questions about mandatory and monetary 
transfers. 
Another difference between IGC-3 and previous conferences was a 
lack of emphasis on the potential riches and rewards associated with 
commercialization of MGRs. Estimates of the monetary worth of MGRs 
are highly speculative, given the inherent uncertainties of the research 
and development process, and the continued lack of research on the 
distribution and potential value of MGRs in ABNJ and national juris-
dictions [21]. This situation creates a major challenge for consensus 
building, because differing expectations about the potential benefits of 
MGRs seem to be shaping the cost/benefit analyses of actors with regard 
to the prospect of creating a heavy or rigid institutional architecture for 
regulating access and benefit sharing. If you believe that major profits 
are possible, especially in the near term, the risk of hampering scientific 
research is worth the potential reward of a well-functioning regulatory 
institution that ensures real benefit sharing. If you believe that a prof-
itable scientific breakthrough from MGRs in ABNJ is unlikely or will 
take a very long time, the cost of impeding or delaying scientific research 
may seem unacceptably high. Although access and benefit sharing are 
addressed in separate draft provisions, these two regulatory areas are 
closely intertwined. Another example of this close connection concerns 
the debate over whether “access” includes the ability to use digital forms 
of genetic data, rather than just physical samples. Although regulating 
access to in situ or ex situ physical samples may be simpler from a defi-
nitional and practical perspective, the reality is that researchers and 
companies increasingly use digital information about genetic material 
that is often available in public databases [22]. 
Two communities that would be affected by the new rules for access 
to MGR and benefit sharing had limited presence at IGC-3: the scientific 
research community, and the industries that utilize genetic resources for 
product development. Instead, delegates from developed states and 
some NGOs would speak on behalf of the interests of these groups, 
typically in broad-strokes comments about the risks and costs of deter-
ring academic and commercial research. Some delegates - including 
from developing states - referred to conversations with members of their 
domestic scientific community in order to provide support for their 
positions. Japan, for example, emphasized the need for scientists to 
research water quality right away after a major maritime accident, and 
4 The MGR portion of the draft treaty (Part II) addresses overall objectives 
(Article 7), applications of the provisions (Article 8), activities with respect to 
MGRs of ABNJ (Article 9) collection of and access to MGRs of ABNJ (Article 
10), the fair and equitable sharing of benefits (Article 11), intellectual property 
rights (Article 12), and monitoring (Article 13) 
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concerns about the impact of prior notification requirements on their 
ability to collect important data. Some NGOs and IGOs reminded dele-
gates that existing institutional resources within the scientific commu-
nity could assist in the process of access and benefit sharing, a point 
which has been reiterated in the academic literature [23]. The limited 
formal voice of the scientific community in these negotiations risks the 
creation of MGR rules that are challenging to implement in practice. For 
example, the very idea that there is a discrete and definable category of 
‘marine genetic resources’ is not reflected in scientific research about 
deep sea organisms, and neither is the distinction between ABNJ and 
national jurisdiction genetic material [24]. More direct involvement of 
the scientific community in the negotiations could mitigate the risk of 
rules that are out of touch with scientific practice and concepts [25]. 
Researchers can also make a positive impact by voluntary disclosure of 
the origins of genetic sequence data used in patents, to increase trans-
parency and traceability for regulatory purposes, and to help reveal the 
links between collection, access, and exploitation [22,26]. 
The topic of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for MGRs is also 
difficult to resolve, for three main reasons. First, it is difficult to 
distinguish (legally or practically) marine scientific research from access 
to and utilization of MGRs. Until the commercialization stage, the ac-
tivities associated with the collection, storage, and analysis of MGRs are 
essentially the same regardless of whether the intention is knowledge or 
profit. And commercially-valuable MGRs can be identified from samples 
that were not originally collected for that purpose [23]. Although ma-
rine scientific research is not defined by UNCLOS, it is an explicit 
freedom of the high seas (Article 87) and cannot constitute “the legal 
basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its re-
sources” (Article 241). So, any system that regulates access and/or al-
lows patent claims over MGRs must distinguish them from marine 
scientific research. Second, IPR regimes are typically designed to limit 
access to patented items and information, to protect the interests of 
investors and thereby encourage investment in research and develop-
ment. This idea is in tension with the notion that a BBNJ agreement 
should provide access to and share benefits from commercial products 
based on MGRs. The major developing world coalitions strongly support 
inclusion of an Article on IPR in the agreement, to ensure that the IPR 
process for MGRs from ABNJ facilitates transparency, accountability, 
and compliance, especially with benefit sharing provisions. Third, the 
topic of genetic resources - how they are defined and how they can be 
patented - is the current subject of two non-BBNJ negotiations, in the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). The discussions in CBD concern the roles of 
Digital Sequence Information in utilization and benefit sharing of ge-
netic resources, while WIPO is hosting negotiations for an agreement 
about the relationship between traditional knowledge and IPR.5 
Although both forums explicitly limit the applicability of their agree-
ments to ABNJ, the existence of other forums with related mandates, and 
the desire for uniformity across international agreements, allows some 
delegates to suggest that the BBNJ participants should delay, defer, or 
displace decisions about the IPR aspect a regime for MGR in ABNJ. 
4.2. Area based management tools, including marine protected areas6 
“The Rio Declaration was in 1992 … colleagues we are in 2019 so I 
think we should move forward”. 
- Delegate from Switzerland, referring to the precautionary principle 
versus precautionary approach, Working Group on ABMTs 8/21/19 
Given this was the third time the international community had 
formally come together to discuss the role of area based management 
tools (ABMTs) including marine protected areas (MPAs) in the context of 
BBNJ, it was somewhat disappointing that delegates continued to 
struggle to define these tools and how they relate to one another. Most of 
the state delegates who offered draft language in the CRP documents 
proposed deleting portions of the definitions for ABMTs and MPAs 
related to “affording higher protection than that provided in the sur-
rounding areas” for one or both of these tools in Article 1 on Use of 
Terms. Some also suggested removing “biodiversity” and/or “sustain-
able use” from the definitions, such that an MPA would simply aim to 
achieve “long-term conservation objectives.” But even the “long term” 
was challenged, as Russia and others emphasized the need to re-evaluate 
any designated ABMT after a certain time period, in order to prevent the 
continuation of these tools after their goals have been achieved. 
A related sticking point focused on the distinction between “estab-
lishing” versus “designating” MPAs, with Canada, CLAM countries, the 
G77/China, Iceland, the Philippines, and Turkey advocating for the 
former, while the EU and Maldives preferred the latter. The relative 
meaning of these terms in relation to one another within the context of 
the developing agreement was not clear, and the US suggested 
substituting both with “identifying” ABMTs and MPAs, while the IUCN 
offered “adoption and implementation” as alternative language with the 
clearest and least ambiguous meaning, which the international com-
munity would be wise to agree on. This debate over wording remains 
important, and points to the ongoing, wider need for internationally- 
recognized definitions for MPAs [27]. It remains to be seen whether 
Conference President Rena Lee and/or the subject area facilitator will 
take the lead on suggesting and defining whatever terms might be 
chosen, or whether outside action from NGOs, IGOs, or other groups can 
contribute to a resolution. 
The relationship between ABMTs and MPAs as categories also 
retained some ambiguity. Canada suggested incorporating language on 
other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) in several 
places, which would be in line with the CBD Aichi Biodiversity Targets. 
OECMs include multiple-use areas and fisheries closures, as well as 
private, local, community-managed, or other forms of informal and/or 
“de facto” protected areas [28]. Together with more strictly-protected 
areas, they can contribute to networks of ABMTs and MPAs, but an 
official definition of an OECM is lacking, further complicating the 
ABMT/MPA definition issue. The IUCN World Commission on Protected 
Areas has created a task force on the subject, which recently published a 
Technical Report for Recognising and Reporting OECMs.7 Including 
these areas significantly helped boost Canada’s progress towards 
attaining the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, in both terrestrial and marine 
5 See coverage on the CBD Meetings by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin [htt 
ps://enb.iisd.org/vol09/enb09725e.html] and [https://enb.iisd.org/vol09 
/enb09710e.html] and of the WIPO Session [https://www.wipo.int/meetings 
/en/details.jsp?meeting_id¼50424] (all accessed 25 January 2020). 
6 The ABMT/MPA portion of the draft treaty (Part III) addresses the objec-
tives of these sites (Article 14), international cooperation and coordination 
(Article 15), identification of areas requiring protection (Article 16), proposals 
(Article 17), consultation on and assessment of proposals (Article 18), decision- 
making (Article 19), implementation (Article 20), and monitoring and review 
(Article 21)  
7 IUCN WCPA Task Force on OECMs [35] Recognising and reporting other 
effective area-based conservation measures, Gland, Switzerland: IUCN 
(accessed 25 January 2020) [https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/48773]. 
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contexts [29], and as of 2019 they have surpassed the 10% target for 
marine protection, and are currently at 13.81%.8 This category of 
ABMTs can complement MPAs but is not a substitution for long-term, 
effective conservation measures. 
The underlying criteria to be used to justify designating ABMTs and 
MPAs also continued to face disagreement, with some states hoping to 
include climate change and ocean acidification considerations outright 
(and even ocean noise pollution in a few cases) while others pushed 
back, arguing that criteria such as vulnerability, fragility, sensitivity, 
and slow recovery already take these pressures into account. A few 
delegates preferred not having criteria outlined here at all, but leaving it 
to the scientific/technical body to determine and then provide guide-
lines. Debates over whether to include socioeconomic factors were less 
prevalent than at the first two IGCs. As in previous IGCs, Eritrea gave an 
explicit defense of including socioeconomic factors, an issue which the 
delegate described as “close to our heart” (Working Group on ABMTs, 8/ 
21/19). Other key issues that arose in the discussions included whether 
and where to include traditional knowledge from indigenous peoples 
and local communities, and whether ABMTs and MPAs should be time- 
bound and adjustable; the latter considerations were favored by Russia, 
China and the USA. 
Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, the ICPC emerged at IGC-3 as a 
clear voice for the interests of its industry. In the ABMT/MPA discus-
sions, their contributions to CRPs requested inclusion of language 
acknowledging (1) the importance of “facilitation of international com-
munications, in particular for small island developing states” (Article 14), 
(2) their role as “sectoral stakeholders, such as the owners and operators of 
existing and planned submarine cables” (Article 15), and (3) that proposals 
include “the coordinates of submarine cables”, whether existing or plan-
ned (Article 17). These proposed amendments to the draft text reflect the 
general trend of UNCLOS as well, which recognizes the goal of facili-
tating international communication in the preamble, and which 
explicitly carves out rights for submarine cable laying in most maritime 
zones. 
The revised draft text for IGC-4 has moved the criteria on identifying 
areas (Article 16) to an Annex, and it now includes language stipulating 
a time duration for a proposed area and measures in proposals (Article 
17). It also more clearly points to the scientific/technical body’s role in 
reviewing proposals (Article 18) but is less clear about whether the 
Conference of Parties will have the authority to take decisions on mat-
ters related to ABMTs (Article 19). 
Moving forward towards IGC-4, critical questions remain about how 
to designate ABMTs and MPAs when relevant instruments/bodies 
already exist and/or where they are lacking, as well as how these in-
struments/bodies should coordinate with one another, e.g. the OSPAR 
network of MPAs and closures under regional fisheries management 
organizations [30]. The issue of adjacency also remains contentious, i.e. 
what role will coastal states have in decision-making regarding the 
adoption and implementation of ABMTs/MPAs adjacent to their mari-
time territories, and how/will their views be taken into account? 
Additionally, including some dynamic approaches to ABMTs and MPAs 
in ABNJ, such as mobile and adaptive sites, could be a thoughtful and 
practical way forward, which will continue be advocated by NGOs in the 
next IGC [31]. 
Hurdles also remain with regard to language incorporating the pre-
cautionary principle and ecosystem approach, which are both now 
mentioned in Article 5 of the revised draft text, on general principles and 
approaches. As evidenced by the quote at the start of this section from 
the Swiss delegate, the ABMT and MPA portion of the discussion at IGC- 
3 certainly highlighted the frustration felt by many that we should be 
further advanced at this stage. 
4.3. Environmental impact assessments (EIAs)9 
“The EIA decision lies with the state party – the whole process of 
having an approval [by an international body] is not one that we 
support.” 
- Delegate from the European Union, Working Group on EIAs 8/22/19 
Divisions between states on the proper conduct of environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) continued in the third round of negotiations. 
Much of the conversation revolved around two areas of disagreement: 
(1) what kind of authority a scientific/technical body would have 
compared to states parties, and (2) whether the stages of an EIA should 
be stipulated in the agreement or set out as (perhaps voluntary) guide-
lines. Neither of these issues were new to IGC-3, but the need to 
reconcile the disparate positions of states has become more acute as the 
negotiations head into their final scheduled meeting. Some observers 
suggested that this issue area has seen more progress towards consensus 
agreements, but it may be simply that the decisions that need to be made 
about the process are especially clear on this topic. 
Most states were in agreement that states parties should be the ones 
to decide whether an EIA is needed. This, however, is one of the few 
points of general agreement. States could not agree on whether it was 
necessary to include in the BBNJ agreement a description of activity or 
ecosystem characteristics where an EIA would clearly be needed (this 
list will be prepared by the Conference of Parties as voluntary guidelines 
(Article 29)). Moreover, states were clearly divided on the process to be 
followed should a state determine that an EIA was not necessary. Many 
developing states, including the African Group, the G77/China, CLAM, 
and the PSIDS, argued that if a state decided an EIA was not necessary, 
they would need to provide evidence to support that decision. The US 
and Canada claimed that the deciding state merely had to make the 
information supporting that decision publicly available; CARICOM, 
PSIDS, and others stated that the decision to forego an EIA should be 
confirmed by the scientific/technical body; and Russia retained its op-
position to the establishment of any kind of new decision-making body 
throughout the BBNJ agreement. Article 49 of the draft text discusses the 
scientific/technical body and highlights some of the possibilities under 
discussion for this institution. While states are in agreement that such a 
body should exist, the expertise necessary for its members and the 
overall role of the body are still up for debate. With such a range of 
positions and support, it is unclear how easily states will be able to 
reconcile into any sort of compromise in the upcoming IGC-4. 
Likewise, there was controversy over how specific the agreement 
should be when it came to providing details for the conduct of EIAs. The 
first of these debates dealt with the issue of scoping. There was a split on 
whether states parties or the scientific/technical body should define the 
scope of EIAs. From there, the states moved into a discussion on whether 
socio-economic and cultural impacts should be included within the 
scope, with CLAM and PSIDS in favor and the EU and others arguing 
instead for a more general definition of scope. Similar issues arose on the 
second day of EIA discussion, in determining the specificity of guidelines 
8 See the Department for Fisheries and Oceans Canada website (accessed 25 
January 2020) [http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/conservation/areas-zones/i 
ndex-eng.html]. 
9 The EIA portion of the draft treaty (Part IV) addresses objectives (Article 21 
bis), the obligation to conduct EIAs (Article 22), the relationship between the 
treaty and EIA processes under other agreements and bodies (Article 23), 
thresholds and criteria for EIAs (Article 24), cumulative impacts (Article 25), 
transboundary impacts (Article 26), areas identified as ecologically or biolog-
ically significant or vulnerable (Article 27), strategic environmental assess-
ments (Article 28), a list of activities that do or do not require an EIA (Article 
29), screening (Article 30), scoping (Article 31), impact assessment and eval-
uation (Article 32), mitigation, prevention and management of potential 
adverse effects (Article 33), public notification and consultation (Article 34), 
preparation and content of EIAs (Article 35), publication of reports (Article 36), 
consideration and review of reports (Article 37), decision-making (Article 38), 
monitoring (Article 39), reporting (Article 40) and review (Article 41) 
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to be provided for EIAs. Some states, including the African Group, G77/ 
China, CARICOM, CLAM, and the EU preferred a list of mandatory in-
formation to be included in EIAs in the agreement. Russia called for an 
annex with an indicative list, and the Republic of Korea called for a 
detailed, voluntary list to be developed later. There was also a split on 
who should be responsible for the reviewing of reports, states parties or 
the scientific/technical body. This recurring debate about whether a 
new body should be created and empowered with a review and/or 
approval role sits at the heart of the EIA issue - who is in charge of 
overseeing new activities in ABNJ? This represents a basic question 
about institutional design: how much delegation of decision-making is 
necessary or acceptable? 
Because EIAs would likely create a new burden or regulatory hurdle 
for private actors, the lack of diverse industry representation was 
notable. But once again, the ICPC advocated tweaks to the draft text in 
CRPs that would minimize obstruction of industry activities in general. 
The ICPC emphasized the need for minimizing “duplicative and incon-
sistent requirements” during discussions on the relationship of the draft 
treaty to other instruments (Article 23), as well as the “expected contri-
bution to sustainable development” with respect to the scope of the 
agreement (Article 31). With respect to impact assessment and evalua-
tion (Article 32), the ICPC suggested language indicating that the State 
Party (or proponent) “shall be authorized to define a planned activity as to 
include future contingencies, such as the maintenance and repair of subma-
rine cables, which shall not require a separate environmental impact 
assessment absent exceptional circumstances.” 
Such disparate and entrenched positions on the authority of states 
versus the authority of a scientific/technical body as yet to be created 
indicates that agreement in IGC-4 may be hard to come by. Discussions 
about the design of any scientific/technical body have been stymied by 
disagreement about what its proper functions would be. Nor is it clear if 
the working group will be able to come together on the important issue 
of what should be included in an EIA, and if a detailed or more general 
approach to such guidelines would be more favorable. While the general 
agreement for a scientific/technical body is there, there remain many 
details still to be worked out. 
4.4. Capacity building and transfer of marine technology (CBTMT)10 
“Our group will put additional emphasis on topic of CBTMT – these 
fine words are enshrined in UNCLOS but their implementation has 
fallen far short of the expectations of developing countries.” 
- Palestine on behalf of the G77/China, opening statement 8/19/19 
At the previous IGC (IGC-2), the discussion about CBTMT had moved 
toward whether it would be monetary vs. non-monetary, and mandatory 
vs. voluntary, and delegates largely fell into traditional categories of 
developed vs. developing states, with Russia and the US both strongly 
favoring voluntary and non-monetary options [4]. During IGC-3, the 
special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs were emphasized again to 
answer these objections to putting money on the table, and the repre-
sentative from the G77/China emphasized that “the idea here is to make 
sure that all countries who want to fulfill their rights and obligations under 
this instrument are able to and have the opportunity to have the capacity 
building and technology they need to do just that” (Working Group on 
CBTMT, 8/20/19). This is especially true, said a member of one of the 
groups, if the aim is to reduce the scientific and technological gap be-
tween developed and developing states. Tuvalu emphasized this in 
pointing out that for instance the PSIDS in combination shared the 
stewardship of 20% of the EEZs in the world - but only one of the 
countries has an oceanographic vessel and only one has government 
staff with expertise in oceanographic issues. This plea for a fulfillment of 
capacity building and technology transfer from developing countries 
was not something that developed countries necessarily were against 
during IGC-3 either, though they in general were clear on it still having 
to be voluntary and non-monetary. Especially Russia emphasized their 
known position, under which cooperation between nations should be 
strictly voluntary and without any kind of legal obligations. How much 
the oxymoron “voluntary commitment” could be expected in practice 
was not explicitly addressed in discussions, although many states 
emphasized past or on-going transfer programs as examples of this. 
Another contentious issue was the reference to “developing middle- 
income countries” in the draft text. This reference and whether or not 
special attention should be given to those countries, was something that 
especially the US, supported by Canada, was against. They stated that 
“… special attention should be given to those most in need such as the LDCs – 
[we] do not believe middle income countries face similar challenges and that 
they should be singled out for special treatment in this regard” (Working 
Group on CBTMT, 8/20/19). This was also reflected in the CRPs on 
CBTT, where the US for example suggested striking out “… and devel-
oping middle income countries” all four times that it was mentioned. The 
EU and its member states similarly suggested striking it out, though only 
twice, and Canada wanted it struck out once. Sri Lanka, however, 
emphasized during the negotiations themselves that 73% of world’s 
poor live in these countries and that they themselves would be one of 
these countries in the near future, but have very poor knowledge and 
technological ability to access and utilize MGRs. This was echoed by 
Iran, which stated that they could not accept a deletion of this term, and 
Palestine on behalf of the G77/China, who would not favor such dele-
tion. Bangladesh and Togo also supported one other in retaining this 
reference, and none of those that gave input in CRPs wanted it struck 
out. One can speculate that a reason why the US opposed this, for 
example, could be due to the World Bank’s classification system, which 
places inter alia China and Russia in this category (upper middle income) 
as well as India (lower middle income) [32]. 
The topic of CBTMT is closely connected to other aspects of the BBNJ 
agenda as well. For example, support for MGR access is sometimes 
described as a form of capacity building, while benefit sharing might 
include the transfer of marine technology related to MGR utilization. 
Developing states, especially SIDS, often argue that capacity building is 
critical to their ability to monitor and enforce ABMTs, or to evaluate the 
quality of EIAs. Despite these important connections, the CBTMT issue 
area has made perhaps the least amount of progress since IGC-1. The 
debate has not gotten more nuanced, and the issues have not been 
revealed as more complex than anticipated. Rather, countries and co-
alitions seem to be entrenching further into their existing positions, 
placing themselves on either side of the monetary vs. non-monetary and 
mandatory vs. voluntary figurative chasm. 
5. Conclusion 
The new BBNJ agreement is intended to connect and coordinate 
fragmented governance institutions to ensure the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ [33]. The debate on 
cross-cutting issues, however, has revealed two major obstacles to 
achieving coherence and synthesis among fragmented institutions. First, 
the “should not undermine” commitment - detailed in our analysis of 
IGC-2 [4] - has been consistently deployed throughout the four issue 
areas to argue that a new BBNJ instrument should not be empowered 
with any oversight or coordination functions in its relationship with 
existing institutions. This means that biodiversity conservation in ABNJ 
must be achieved without the BBNJ treaty itself exerting any direct 
control over shipping or fishing activities. Second, the status of the BBNJ 
as an ‘implementing agreement’ has only two precedents to rely on: the 
Part XI agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement, both referred to as 
10 The CBTMT portion of the draft treaty (Part V) addresses overall objectives 
(Article 42), cooperation in CBTMT (Article 43), modalities for CBTMT (Article 
44), additional modalities for TMT (Article 45), types of CBTMT (Article 46), 
and monitoring and review (Article 47) 
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‘implementing agreements.’ But the Part XI agreement effectively fused 
with UNCLOS, whereas the Fish Stocks Agreement is a freestanding 
treaty. The discussions about the modalities of a BBNJ instrument 
strongly suggest that delegates are anticipating an implementing 
agreement akin to the Fish Stocks Agreement, such that non-members of 
UNCLOS can fully participate. This represents a missed opportunity to 
enhance the unity and coherence of the ocean governance regime, and to 
promote universal participation by states . 
Despite these structural limitations, a BBNJ instrument still has the 
potential to be a valuable tool in achieving the goals of conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity in ABNJ. The draft text provided prior to 
IGC-3 was an important step towards a treaty, as is the revised draft text 
released in November 2019. However, a substantial amount of inter- 
sessional work will be necessary prior to IGC-4 if the process is to fin-
ish on schedule. To support progress in the negotiations, any inter- 
sessional meetings and conversations will have to seek new compro-
mises and build consensus across a broad, and geographically distrib-
uted, group of delegates. Several inter-sessional meetings that do not 
directly address the BBNJ agenda, but do so obliquely, or that bring 
together relevant actors, are already scheduled for the period before 
IGC-4 in March 2020. These include, inter alia, the Our Ocean Confer-
ence (October 2019, Norway), the Global Ocean Social Sciences meeting 
(November 2019, France), the Ocean Sciences meeting of the American 
Geophysical Union (November 2019, United States), and the World 
Biodiversity Forum (February 2020, Switzerland), as well as a number of 
less formal workshops organized by NGOs and IGOs. Bodies with over-
lapping work (e.g. the ISA and CBD) will hold various issue-specific 
meetings in the inter-sessional period, and the relevant WIPO commit-
tee is slated to continue its work on IPR for genetic resources, with the 
goal of submitting recommendations for a new instrument to the UN 
General Assembly in 2021. Additional meetings with a BBNJ-specific 
focus are currently being organized among small groups of actors, but 
whether and how these meetings might supper intra- and inter- 
coalitional compromises remains to be seen. 
The emerging BBNJ agreement seems “stuck in the middle” in 
several senses. While IGC-3 occurred just after the midpoint of sched-
uled negotiations, the discussions themselves do not feel “halfway” to-
wards a final agreement. And many topics remain stuck between the two 
competing, and arguably opposite, principles of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind and the Freedom of the Seas, including the implied and 
hoped for monetary benefits that would emerge from the application of 
the former with reference to the potential exploitation of MGRs. Finally, 
the BBNJ agreement is intended to exist between the current suite of 
fragmented governance institutions in a way that allows it to enhance 
coordination and cooperation between them. But the commitment that a 
new agreement should “not undermine” existing agreements has been 
interpreted restrictively in many of the issue areas, increasing the like-
lihood that the BBNJ is boxed into the spaces between agreements as 
opposed to actively identifying and creating synergies between them. 
Indeed, although most major coalitions favored the positive framing of 
“promotes coherence and coordination” in Article 4(3), the revised draft 
text for IGC-4 has eliminated this text. Thus, at this stage, it seems as if 
the emergence of a new, effective, and consensus BBNJ agreement faces 
structural obstacles and persistent disagreements, leaving it stuck in the 
middle of the path between initiating and concluding this multi-year 
process. 
Author statement “stuck in the middle” 
The authors are not depositing research data for this article. Though 
we do rely to some extent on data from a database that is under devel-
opment (since the project period is not finished before the last IGC has 
been concluded for the BBNJ treaty), the article is a Viewpoint piece – 
and not a research article per se. 
When the research team concludes the data acquisition period, 
hopefully by the end of April 2020, and publish a research article on the 
topic, the database will also be shared our. At that point, it will have 
been properly coded and made possible for external users to navigate so 
that it is both accessible and discoverable. 
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